Background
The Supreme Court has acquitted a man convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), holding that the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act are not absolute.
A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria allowed the appeal in Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi on September 17, 2026. The Court set aside the Delhi High Court judgment that had upheld the conviction and held that the prosecution had failed to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant had been sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and one year of rigorous imprisonment under Section 363 IPC. The trial court had acquitted him of the charge under Section 506 IPC.
The prosecution case arose from an incident in which a two-and-a-half-year-old girl allegedly went missing while playing near the family’s jhuggi. She was later found in a nearby park and was alleged to have been taken there by the appellant. The prosecution alleged that blood was noticed on the child’s clothes and that she named the appellant.
The trial court convicted the appellant, and the Delhi High Court subsequently upheld the conviction. The matter then reached the Supreme Court.
Legal Issue
The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction could be sustained when the prosecution evidence contained significant contradictions and the medical and forensic evidence did not support the prosecution’s version.
The Court also examined the scope of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act.
Section 29 creates a presumption against an accused prosecuted for specified POCSO offences, including offences under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9, once the statutory conditions for the presumption are attracted. Section 30 creates a presumption regarding the existence of a culpable mental state in offences under the Act where such mental state is required.
The Court emphasised that these provisions create a departure from the ordinary principle that an accused is presumed innocent, but they do not eliminate the prosecution’s initial burden of establishing the foundational facts of its case.
Court Ruling
The Supreme Court found material contradictions between the evidence of the complainant and the private doctor who had initially examined the child. The Court noted discrepancies regarding the time when the child was brought for examination and the person who accompanied her.
The Court also found that important aspects later stated by the complainant were absent from the FIR. The complainant had claimed that the police were informed by telephone, but this was not corroborated by any police witness. The FIR itself was registered two days after the alleged incident.
The medical and forensic evidence also raised significant concerns. The doctor at AIIMS who examined the child found no injury or bloodstains over the vulva and recorded that the hymen was intact without abnormality. The forensic expert also stated that none of the seven parcels examined for biological and DNA evidence contained semen or male DNA, and blood was not detected on the child’s clothes.
The Court clarified that the mere absence of injuries or semen does not automatically disprove sexual assault. However, it found the present case materially different because the medical and forensic evidence, when considered alongside the other evidence, contradicted the prosecution’s account and ruled out the alleged penetrative act on the evidence available.
The Court also considered the defence allegation that the complaint was motivated by an earlier dispute between the two families concerning a common water connection. The complainant’s own cross-examination supported the existence of the water connection and a quarrel between the families.
The Court therefore found that the prosecution’s evidence had significant gaps and contradictions and that the defence version had acquired evidentiary support.
The Supreme Court then examined the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30. Referring to earlier decisions, including Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Court held that the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains undiminished. The accused’s burden to rebut the statutory presumption is comparatively lower and can be discharged on the basis of a preponderance of probability.
The Court relied on the principle that Section 29 does not operate mechanically. The prosecution must first establish the foundational facts necessary for the statutory presumption to operate. Once the accused successfully exposes material inconsistencies and presents a probable defence, the presumption can no longer be treated as sufficient by itself to sustain the conviction.
The Court consequently held that the prosecution had failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It set aside the Delhi High Court and trial court judgments and acquitted the appellant of the offences under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Court also directed that he be released forthwith if he was still in custody, unless required in connection with another offence.
Implications
The judgment clarifies that the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act do not replace the prosecution’s obligation to prove its case. The prosecution must first establish the foundational facts necessary for the statutory presumptions to operate.
The decision also makes clear that an accused facing a POCSO charge is not required to rebut the statutory presumption by proving innocence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused can rebut the presumption by establishing a probable defence, while the ultimate burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution.
At the same time, the ruling does not establish a general rule that absence of physical injuries, semen or DNA evidence is sufficient to acquit an accused in every POCSO case. The Supreme Court’s conclusion arose from the combined effect of the contradictions in the prosecution evidence, the medical and forensic findings, and the defence version in this particular case.
The judgment therefore reinforces the requirement for courts to objectively assess the entire evidence even when a statutory presumption under the POCSO Act is attracted. The presumption cannot be used as a substitute for scrutiny of the prosecution’s evidence.
The judgment adds clarity on the operation of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, reaffirming that statutory presumptions are rebuttable and do not dispense with the prosecution’s fundamental burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Case Title: Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi
