Single-Judge Bench rules that Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act does not grant indefeasible right to re-enter former shared household where suitable alternative residence is available.
The Delhi High Court, in an order delivered on 11 February 2026, dismissed the plea of an 81-year-old woman seeking restoration of possession and re-entry into her matrimonial home, holding that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) does not confer a definitive right to occupy a specific property when suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard is available. Justice Ravinder Dudeja authored the order.
The case is reported as X v. Y before the Delhi High Court (Single Judge Bench), the formal title as per the High Court docket.
Background of the Case
The petitioner-woman had lived in the matrimonial home with her husband for nearly six decades. In April 2023, she moved temporarily to her daughter’s residence for medical treatment. Upon attempting to return in July 2023, she alleged she was denied entry into the matrimonial home. Contending that she had been rendered shelterless and excluded from the shared household, she filed an application under Sections 19 and 23 of the DV Act seeking a residence order permitting her to re-enter the property.
The trial court and further judicial forums had declined her plea. She challenged those decisions before the Delhi High Court.
Legal Issue
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the DV Act affords an indefeasible right to re-enter a former shared household, in this case, the matrimonial home, when the aggrieved woman has voluntarily shifted to another residence and suitable alternate accommodation is available.
Under the DV Act, a “shared household” can include a residence where a domestic relationship exists, and Section 19 empowers courts to pass residence orders to prevent women from being rendered roofless or unsafe. The challenge was whether this statutory protection mandates re-entry into a specific property regardless of changed circumstances.
Court’s Ruling
The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition. It held that the DV Act does not confer an absolute or indefeasible right upon an aggrieved woman to insist on residence in a specific property, particularly one she had abandoned voluntarily, when suitable alternative living arrangements of comparable standard are available.
The Court found that:
- The petitioner had voluntarily shifted to another residence belonging to her husband for medical purposes and had remained there.
- The alternate accommodation was of equivalent standard, meaning she was not left roofless or facing destitution.
- Compelling re-entry into the former property would disturb the settled possession of current occupants and convert a protective statute into a general rule for re-entry into any past residence.
The Bench emphasised that the right to residence under Section 19 is discretionary and equitable. It balances the rights of the aggrieved woman with the rights of owners or occupants. Accordingly, restoration or re-entry cannot be mechanically granted when the statutory object, to prevent shelterlessness or unsafe conditions, is already satisfied through alternative living arrangements.
Reasoning of the Court
Justice Dudeja noted that the woman’s shift to the alternate residence was not shown to have been caused by violence, coercion, or force. Instead, she moved for treatment and had settled there with her consent. The court pointed to evidence such as the affixing of her name outside the alternate residence as indicative of voluntary choice.
The court further articulated that if alternate accommodation is available and the petitioner is not rendered shelterless, then compelling restoration of the former residence would amount to going beyond the legislative intent of the domestic violence statute, which is designed to provide protective and remedial relief — not to resolve property disputes or guarantee occupation of a specific prior residence.
The Court reiterated that residence orders under Section 19 are not automatic but depend on the facts of each case and the protective purpose of the statute.
Practical Implications
- The ruling clarifies that the DV Act’s residence rights are protective and discretionary, not absolute or proprietary, particularly where alternative accommodation is available.
- Courts will assess whether a petitioner has been rendered roofless or unsafe before issuing residence orders, rather than automatically directing re-entry into a past shared household.
- The decision underscores judicial caution against using the DV Act to convert property disputes into domestic violence claims where statutory conditions for protective relief are not truly met.
The judgment adds clarity on the scope and limits of residence orders under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, emphasising that an aggrieved woman’s right to occupy a former matrimonial home is not indefeasible when suitable alternate accommodation exists and she is not rendered roofless.
